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A MANDATORY RIGHT TO
COUNSEL FOR THE MATERIAL
WITNESS
In a criminal case, authorities detain a material witness when
they believe that the witness will not voluntarily appear at trial.
A material witness is "a witness whose testimony is crucial to
either the defense or prosecution. In most states, he may be re-
quired to furnish bond for his appearance, and, for lack of
surety, he may be confined until he testifies."' The same factors
that lead the authorities to believe that a witness may not return
for trial, such as indigence or lack of community ties,' make it
likely that a material witness will be unable to post bond set by
the court or a magistrate. Unless there is a statutory maximum
period of confinement or a provision requiring that the police
depose and release the material witness within a specific period
of time,8 detained material witnesses who are unable to post
bond may be held in custody until they testify at the defend-
ant's trial.4 As a result, large numbers of material witnesses are
detained annually. 5
Both federal and state statutes authorize the initial arrest and
possible detention of material witnesses believed by the authori-
ties to be unwilling to testify at trial.6 A few state statutes have
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1438 (5th ed. 1979). See Stein v. People, 346 U.S. 156,
184 (1953)(stressing that "[tihe duty to disclose knowledge of crime rests upon all citi-
zens. It is so vital that one known to be innocent may be detained, in the absence of bail,
as a material witness."); Application of Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207, 1213 (1977) (defining
a material witness as "an innocent citizen whose right to the full enjoyment of liberty is
threatened solely because of his potential usefulness as a witness for the government...
the deprivation of liberty, although temporary by definition, can be measured in weeks
or even months."). See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3144 (West 1985)(providing statutory author-
ity on the federal level for the arrest and detention of the material witness).
2. Material witnesses are frequently detained because they are from out-of-state, or
because they are indigent. Because they have no ties to the community, they are incar-
cerated to ensure their testimony at trial. St. Louis Globe Democrat, June 2-3, 1979, at
El, col. 3.
3. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 24-26, 29-30, 37 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3144 (West 1985); FED. R. Cim. P. 46(b). See also ALA.
CODE §§ 15-11-12 to -14, 14-6-3 (1975); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 12.30.020, .050-.060 (1984); ARiz.
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provided a mandatory right to counsel for the material witness.7
The federal statute includes a discretionary right to counsel for
the material witness.8
The lack of a mandatory right to counsel creates problems for
the material witness. First, because he or she has not been ac-
cused of any crime, the material witness is not entitled to the
same constitutional protections as are criminal suspects despite
the similarities between the criminal suspect and the material
witness." Second, police sometimes misuse material witness stat-
utes to incarcerate a suspect until they gather enough evidence
to formally charge the material witness as a criminal
defendant. 10
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-4, 13-408 to -4084 (1978 & Supp. 1984); ARK. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-
623 to -627 (1977); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 878-882 (Deering 1983);
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 17; CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-63c, -82j, -82k (1979); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, §§ 1910, 6256 (1974 & Supp. 1984), CT. C. P. R. 46(b); HAWAII RED. STAT. §§ 804-15
to -19, 835-1 to -8 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 109-3(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984);
ch. 31, §§ 17-18.1 (Smith-Hurd 1969); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 804.11, 804.23, 811.2, 815.6
(West 1979); KAN. STAT. § 22-2805 (1981); Ky. R. CRIM. P. 7.06; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
15:257-:259 (West 1981); ME. R. CRIM. P. 46(b); MD. CTS. JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-203
(1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, §§ 45-52, 54; ch. 277, §70; ch. 262, §30 (Michie/Law.
Co-op. 1980); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 765.29, 767.34-.35 (West 1982); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 625.10, 629.54-.55 (West 1983); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-7 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 544.420-.440 (1978); Mo. Sup. CT. R. 23.08-.09; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 23; MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 46-11-601, -15-201 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178-494 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 597:22-:23, 619:23 (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:162-2 to -4 (West 1971);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-3-7 (1978); N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST. CTS. 25; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 5;
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 620.10-.80 (McKinney 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-521, -803,
152-7 (1983); N.D. CONST. art I, § 6; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 31-03-19 to -20, -24 (1974); N.D.
R. CRIM. P. 46(e); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2937.16 -.18, 2941.48 (Baldwin 1975); OHIO R.
CRIM. P. 15(a); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 270, 271, 273-275, 719 (West 1969 & Supp.
1984); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 136.607-.615 (1981); R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 46(b); R.I. DIST.
CT. R. CRiM. 46(b); S.C. CONST art. I § 15; S.C. CODE §§ 17-15-10, -70, -110, -140, -150
(1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-12-1, -43-18 (1979); TEx. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN.
art. 17.34-.38 (Vernon 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 6605, 7551 (1974); VA. CODE §§
19.2-127, -128, -135, -137, -152 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.52.040 (1980); WASH.
SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 6.12(e), 6.13(a); W. VA CODE § 62-1C-15 (1984); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§
969.01(3), 967.04(1) (West 1971 & Supp 1984); WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 12; Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§§ 7-8-118 to -121, 1-12-109 to -110 (1977); Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 8(b), 8(f), 17(a); UNIF. ACT
TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES FROM WITHOUT A STATE IN CRIMINAL PROCEED-
INGS, 11 U.L.A. 5 (1974).
7. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No
person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self .... See also Carlson & Voelpel, Material Witness and Material Injustice, 58
WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1980); Sheleff & Shichor, Victimological Aspects of Bystander Involve-
ment, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 193, 201 (1980) ("In some respects, the witness actually has
fewer rights than does the accused. The accused may refuse to give evidence; this right is
denied to the witness except when the evidence may be self-incriminating.").
10. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
Counsel for the Material Witness
Perhaps in response to some of these problems, both individ-
ual states,"' and the federal government, 2 have attempted to re-
form material witness statutes, with mixed success.'3 Although
there have been reforms in other areas affecting the material
witness on the federal level, the provision of counsel for the ma-
terial witness is still a matter of judicial discretion.14 In fact, a
federal legislative attempt to adopt a mandatory right to counsel
for the material witness failed in 1984.15
This Note argues that a uniform statute establishing a
mandatory right to counsel should be adopted, at both the state
and federal levels, to afford to the material witness protection
that the Constitution fails to provide. Part I describes the gen-
eral scope of the problem and concludes that neither the federal
government, the individual states, nor the United States Consti-
tution provides the material witness with a mandatory right to
counsel. Part II argues that the material witness should have a
statutorily mandated right to counsel. A mandatory right to
counsel should be extended to the material witness both for the
protection of the witness' rights and for the encouragement of
witness participation in the criminal justice system. Part III
briefly considers a potential counter-argument to the claim that
the material witness should be given a statutory right to counsel,
and concludes that the provision of counsel for the material wit-
ness need not threaten the constitutional rights of the defendant
to confront his or her accuser. Finally, Part IV presents a model
statute establishing such a mandatory right to counsel for the
material witness and evaluates recent federal legislation that was
considered by Congress in 1984.
I. THE FAILURE OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM TO PROVIDE THE
MATERIAL WITNESS WITH A MANDATORY RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Material witness statutes date back several hundred years. In
the course of their evolution, however, the material witness has
never been guaranteed the right to counsel.
11. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 36-40, 91-95, 100-07 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
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A. Origin of Material Witness Statutes
The origin of the power to arrest material witnesses is not
clear.16 Originally, material witnesses who were likely to leave
the jurisdiction were detained because of the difficulty of travel
between states. 17 Distance was a very substantial barrier to a
witness' return, and a witness who left a jurisdiction was there-
fore unlikely to be available for trial.18 In early twentieth-cen-
tury cases, detention of material witnesses was allowed only if
the witness refused to appear or to provide recognizances. 9
Courts deemed the inability to pay equivalent to a refusal to
pay.20
B. Federal Material Witness Statutes
The first federal statute providing for the arrest and detention
of material witnesses was enacted in 1789,21 and it remained in
effect until a general revision of the United States Criminal
Code in 1948.22 Neither the first statute, nor Rule 46(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which replaced the statute,
provided the material witness with a mandatory right to
counsel.2 3
16. Although some courts have claimed that this power derived from the common
law, see, e.g., In re Craig, 20 Hawaii 447, 450 (1911), others have traced the existence of
material witness statutes to a sixteenth-century English law. Id.; Linsky v. County of
Luzerne, 101 Pa. Super. Ct. 42, 44 (1931)(citing 1 and 2 P. & M. c. 13 (1554)).
17. Carlson & Voelpel, supra note 9, at 3.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., In re Craig, 20 Hawaii 447, 451 (1911).
20. See, e.g., Howard & Cook v. Grace, 18 Minn. 398, 402 (1872).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 659 (1925):
Any judge of the United States, on the application of a district attorney, and on
being satisfied by proof that the testimony of any person is competent and will
be necessary on the trial of any criminal proceeding in which the United States
are parties or are interested, may compel such person to give recognizance, with
or without sureties, at his discretion, or to appear to testify therein; and for that
purpose, may issue a warrant against such a person, under his hand, with or
without seal, directed to the marshall or other officer authorized to execute pro-
cess in behalf of the United States, to arrest and bring him such person. If the
person so arrested neglects or refuses to give recogizance in the manner so re-
quired, the judge may issue a warrant of commitment against him, and the of-
ficer shall convey him to the prison therein. And the said person shall remain in
confinement for the purpose of giving his testimony, or until he gives the recog-
nizance required by said judge.
22. C.f. Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 1971).
23. Until 1972, Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure stated:
If it appears by affidavit that the testimony of a person is material in any crimi-
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The Bail Reform Act of 1966 provided a more liberal provision
concerning material witnesses.2"' This Act and its amendments,
along with Rule 46(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure,25 provide current authority for the arrest of material wit-
nesses and the bail setting procedures.26
In 1970, Congress amended the Criminal Justice Administra-
tion Act and included material witnesses in the federal statute
authorizing discretionary appointment of counsel.27 As a result,
nal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure his
presence by subpoena, the court or commissioner may require him to give bail
for his appearance as a witness, in an amount fixed by the court or commis-
sioner. If the person fails to give bail, the court or commissioner may commit
him to the custody of the marshall pending final disposition of the proceeding in
which the testimony is needed, may order his release if he has been detained for
an unreasonable length of time and may modify at any time the requirement of
bail.
In 1972, Rule 46(b) was amended. See infra note 25 for text of the current rule.
24. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3(a), 80 Stat. 214, 216 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C § 3149 (1982)) (repealed 1984). The revised bail code liberalized
conditions for release of detainees, including both defendants and material witnesses.
Further liberalization of federal material witness statutes followed in 1978. Until 1978,
material witnesses held by the federal government received only one dollar a day for the
period of incarceration preceding those days actually spent at trial. 28 U.S.C. § 1821
(1976) (amended 1978). In 1973, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of stat-
utorily defined minimum payment plans for material witnesses. Hurtado v. United
States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973). In Hurtado, the petitioner sought to recover witness fees of
twenty dollars per day of incarceration, the amount granted to witnesses appearing in
court. The Court ruled that material witness detention neither constitutes involuntary
servitude because of low witness fees, id. at 589, 590 n.11, nor a taking of property with-
out just compensation under the fifth amendment. Id. at 589. In 1978, Congress amended
the witness payment schedule, authorizing payment of thirty dollars per day of confine-
ment. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b), (d)(4)(Supp. III 1979).
25. FED. R. CalM. P. 46(b):
A person released before trial shall continue on release during trial under the
same terms and conditions as were previously imposed unless the court deter-
mines that other terms and conditions or termination of release are necessary to
assure his presence during the trial to assure that his conduct will not obstruct
the orderly and expeditious progress of the trial.
26. Between 1948 and 1984, there was no explicit authority for the arrest of material
witnesses. Instead, federal courts inferred the right from 18 U.S.C. § 3159 and Rule 46(b)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Anfield, 539 F.2d 674,
677 (9th Cir. 1976); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 941-43 (9th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Coldwell, 496 F. Supp. 305, 307 (E.D. Okla. 1979). In 1984 Congress added a
separate statute specifically authorizing the arrest of material witnesses, but did not
make any explicit substantive changes. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3144 (West 1985). See infra notes
100-07 and accompanying text for further discussion of 1984 attempts at reform.
27. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(a)(3) (West 1985):
(a) Choice of plan
Each United States district court, with the approval of the judicial council of the
circuit, shall place in operation throughout the district a plan for furnishing rep-
resentation for any person unable to obtain adequate representation ...
(3) who is subject to revocation of parole, in custody as a material witness, or
seeking collateral relief, as provided in subsection (g).
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indigent material witnesses who are unable to secure counsel
may have counsel appointed by the court if the judge believes
"it is in the interest of justice. ' s8 On the federal level, therefore,
28. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(g) (West 1985): "Discretionary appointments.-Any person
... in custody as a material witness... may be furnished representation pursuant to
the plan whenever the United States magistrate or the court determines that the inter-
ests of justice so require and such person is financially unable to obtain representation."
But see Telephone interview with Meryl Silverman, Advisory Attorney for the Crimi-
nal Justice Act Division of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (Nov. 15, 1985).
The Criminal Justice Act Division recently amended the GUIDELINES FOR THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, vol. VII, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY AND PROCE-
DURES, to reflect the impact of the 1984 amendments to the Criminal Justice Act.
Silverman explained that Congress did not think carefully about the implications of 18
U.S.C.A. § 3142(f) (West 1985) for the material witness. The Criminal Justice Act Divi-
sion of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts has interpreted the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act as mandating a court hearing and the appointment of counsel for the
material witness because of the interaction of § 3142(f) with §§ 3144, 3006A(a)(2), (a)(5).
See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3006A(a)(2), (a)(5), 3142(f), 3144 (West 1985). The relevant text of
the GUIDELINES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, vol. VII, GUIDE
TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES provides:
CHAPTER 2. APPOINTMENT AND PAYMENT OF COUNSEL
Section 1. Eligibility for Representation Under the Act
2.01 District Plans
A. Each district court, with the approval of the judicial council, is required
to have a plan for furnishing representation for any person financially unable to
obtain adequate representation:
(1) who is charged with a felony or misdemeanor (other than a petty offense as
defined in Section 1 of Title 18 of the United States Code, unless the defendant,
charged with a petty offense, faces the likelihood of loss of liberty, if convicted)
or with juvenile delinquency (See 18 U.S.C. 5034 with regard to appointment of
counsel; for appointment of guardian ad litem, see paragraph 3.14 below) or with
a violation of probation or parole;
(2) who is under arrest, when such representation is required by law;
(3) who is in custody as a material witness, or seeking collateral relief, as pro-
vided in Subsection (g) of the Criminal Justice Act (See paragraph 2.15 below
regarding material witness representation).
2.15 Representation of a Material Witness.
While subsection (g) of the CJA provides for the discretionary appointment of
counsel for a person in custody as a material witness "when the interests of jus-
tice so require," the Ball Reform Act of 1984 requires that counsel be appointed
to provide representation at a detention hearing for a person who has been ar-
rested as a material witness. See sections 3144 and 3142 (f) of title 18, United
States Code, as amended by P.L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, October 12, 1984. This
requirement is incorporated into the CJA through the operation of subsection
(a)(2) of the CJA which provides for the furnishing of representation to a person
"who is under arrest when such representation is required by law" as well as
subsection (a)(5) which provides for the representation of a person "for whom, in
a case in which he faces loss of liberty, any Federal law requires the appointment
of counsel." The $500 limit set forth in subsection (d)(2) of the CJA applies to
representation throughout the material witness proceedings.
Because this interpretation is not binding, on the courts, Ms. Silverman says that the
Criminal Justice Act Division would prefer statutory authority. However, this interpreta-
tion does provide advocates with further support for appointment of counsel for the ma-
terial witness.
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the material witness' right to counsel is purely discretionary, and
the decision as to whether or not counsel should be appointed
rests entirely with the judge in the underlying criminal case.
Currently, use of the federal statute results in the confinement
of large numbers of material witnesses annually. One estimate is
that there were nearly 200,000 witness/days spent in detention
in 1978 on the federal level alone.29 More recent data available
indicates that during the twelve-month period ending June 30,
1983, federal magistrates processed 5,085 material witnesses in
federal district courts. 30 Currently, up to half of all federal of-
fenses in states bordering on Mexico may involve material
witnesses. 31
Both prosecutors and defense attorneys continue to find mate-
rial witness statutes useful for two reasons. The first involves the
defendant's constitutional right to a complete defense.32 In some
cases, witness detention is useful to preserve exculpatory testi-
mony. In illegal alien smuggling cases, for example, the defense
commonly requests detention of the allegedly smuggled aliens. 33
29. Carlson & Voelpel, supra note 9, at 35. The final statistic was obtained by divid-
ing the total compensation paid by the federal government to U.S. citizens held as mate-
rial witnesses by the statutorily determined amount that they are paid per day. Illegal
aliens, however, are forbidden by statute to receive compensation. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(e)
(1982). Therefore, given that the authors did not include illegal aliens held as material
witnesses in computing the totals, these figures may underestimate the total number of
material witnesses held in custody. For a discussion of the scope of detention of illegal
aliens, see infra note 33 and accompanying text.
30. 1983 ANN. REP., in REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED CONFERENCE 201 (table 62) (1983). Analogous data is not available for fiscal
year 1984. Compare 1984 ANN. REP., in REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED CONFERENCE 444-47 (table M-3) (1984).
31. Telephone interview with Roger Wolf, Tuscon, Arizona attorney involved in the
drafting of an illegal alien release provision currently in use in Arizona (Sept. 8, 1984).
Interestingly, illegal aliens are no longer exclusively Mexican, or even Central American,
but also include Koreans, Iranians, Yugoslavians and other Eastern Europeans. Tele-
phone Interview with Robert A. Shivers, San Antonio, Texas attorney active in the rep-
resentation of illegal aliens (Sept. 8, 1984). Illegal aliens complicate the material witness
problem, but the topic of illegal alien material witnesses will not be discussed in depth in
this Note. Illegal aliens face all the problems of other material witnesses. They also face
additional hurdles of a bond required by the border patrol, and the constant threat of
being placed in deportation or being formally charged with a border violation under 8
U.S.C. § 1325 (1982). See infra note 33 for discussion of judicial treatment of the illegal
alien material witness.
32. 3 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 23.3(e), 17 (1984) (stating that
the defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process, and the fifth amendment
right not to be disadvantaged by financial status, have led all jurisdictions to adopt
"statutes or court rules authorizing defense use of the court's subpoena power to compel
the attendance of witnesses at trial.").
33. Authorities apply material witness statutes to illegal aliens to help convict smug-
glers of aliens. (Smuggled aliens are often referred to as polles, or chickens, and the
smugglers are referred to as coyotes-the chickens are used to catch the coyote.) In
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The second reason for continued use of material witness deten-
tion statutes is the prosecution's need for corroborative testi-
mony to ensure convictions in some cases. State and federal
prosecutors seek detention of material witnesses more often than
do defendants, hoping to compel testimony at trial that will lead
to conviction of the accused. 4
C. State Material Witness Statutes
Estimates of material witness detention under state laws are
not available. 5 Because state material witness statutes vary
greatly, the material witness receives widely disparate treatment
from state to state,3 6 including but not limited to conditions of
release and witness compensation.3 7 While some states have re-
cently amended old material witness statutes,38 only eight state
United States v. Mendez-Rodriquez, the Ninth Circuit held that deportation of aliens to
their homelands before the defendant-smuggler's attorney has been able to interview
them deprives defendants of their fifth and sixth amendment rights. 450 F.2d 1, 5 (9th
Cir. 1970). Since that decision, federal courts have limited the applicability of the Men-
dez-Rodriquez rule. See, e.g., United States v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 420, 422 (9th Cir.
1974). In addition, federal courts require that the defendant make an affirmative effort
to request that the witnesses be detained. See Uribe v. United States, 529 F.2d 742, 743
(5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Romero, 469 F.2d 1078, 1079 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. de-
nied, 410 U.S. 985 (1973). There has also been a movement toward the exercise of judi-
cial discretion on the trial court level, in determining which illegal aliens need be held as
material witnesses. See United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1120 (1977).
34. Cf. 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 12.4(0, 150 (1984) (noting
that prospective witnesses in cases involving felonies or major crimes may be brought
before a judge on application of counsel, most generally the prosecutor).
35. There is no centralized data concerning the numbers of material witnesses ar-
rested on the state level.
36. Material witness' rights are statutorily defined, on both the federal and state
level. See supra note 6.
37. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 15-11-12 to -14, 14-6-3 (1975) (allowing confinement of
prosecution witnesses, including minors and married women, for failure to enter $100
recognizance in any criminal case); N.D. CONST. art. I., § 12; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 31-03-19
to -20, -24 (1976); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46(e); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:162-2 to -4 (West 1971)
(providing for comfortable lodging, separated from defendants or convicts, with as little
restriction on movement as possible, but allowing only three dollars per diem in witness
fees); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 620.80 (McKinney 1984)(providing appointed counsel, but
allowing witness fees of only three dollars a day. Practice Commentary, provided by Jo-
seph W. Bellacosa, ridicules the stipend: "A material witness who cannot make bail and
is thus held in custody is entitled to the magnificent compensation of $3 per diem. Per-
haps the fine meals and exquisite lodging sometimes afforded in these situations is
viewed as sufficient compensation for the enormous deprivation involved."); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 136.607-.615 (1981) (allowing commitment of witnesses for inability, not refusal,
to furnish bond; authorizing compensation of $7.50 per day).
38. Some states have reformed their material witness confinement procedures, requir-
ing that a deposition be taken within a specific time period, or that material witnesses
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statutes provide a mandatory right to counsel for material wit-
nesses.39 Because the rights of the material witness are deter-
mined by statute, and state statutes vary widely with regard to
treatment of the material witness, the greatest abuses of the ma-
terial witness appear to occur on the state level.4 0
D. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments Do Not Protect the
Material Witness
Both the fifth and sixth amendments may appear to provide
the material witness with a mandatory right to counsel, either
through the application of the prophylactic Miranda warnings,
designed to protect the fifth amendment right of the accused
against compelled self-incrimination,41 or through the expansion
of the sixth amendment right to counsel 2 to guarantee represen-
tation for all individuals involved in trial proceedings "inti-
mately related ' 43 to the criminal trial. Unfortunately, because
they are limited in application to criminal proceedings, 4 neither
the fifth amendment nor the sixth amendment can be inter-
preted to grant the detained material witness a right to counsel.
1. The fifth amendment does not provide a mandatory right
to counsel for the material witness- Police abuse of material
witness statutes might justify an expansion of fifth amendment-
can be held for only a limited time period. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-4083(B), (C)
(Spec. Supp. 1978) (witness deposed and released within three days); CAL. CONST. art. I, §
6, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 878-882 (Deering 1983) (witness cannot be held more than ten
days); N.M. R. CrIM. P. DIST. CT. 25 (witness must be deposed and released within five
days, with possible extensions); N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW §§ 620.10-.80 (McKinney 1984);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 969.01(3), 967.04(1) (West 1971 & Supp. 1984) (witness may be held
for a maximum of 15 days before deposition and release). Other states do not specify
timetables, but do require that witnesses be confined only as long as is necessary to
depose the witness. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.30.030, .050-.060 (1985); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-2805 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-601 (1985).
39. COLO. CONsT. art. II, § 17; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-63c (Supp. 1984); ILL ANN. STAT.
ch. 31, §§ 17-18.1 (Smith-Hurd 1969) (only witnesses detained by a coroner at an inquest
have the right to counsel); KAN. STAT. § 22-2805 (1981); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 262, § 30;
ch. 276, §§ 45-52, 54; ch. 277, § 70 (1980); N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 5; N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW §§
620.10-.80 (McKinney 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-521, -803, 152-7 (1983); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, §§ 270, 271, 273-275, 719 (West 1969 & Supp. 1984).
40. See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text for discussion of abusive police
practices on the state level relating to the material witness.
41. See supra note 9; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (expanding the fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination to include pre-trial custodial questioning by
the police).
42. See supra note 9; infra notes 54-71 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 49-53, 67-71 and accompanying text.
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derived Miranda protections to encompass material witnesses.
Because police sometimes arrest suspects as material witnesses
and use their non-criminal status to engage in custodial interro-
gation without providing Miranda warnings,"" the material wit-
ness may be entitled to the constitutional protections owed to
the criminal suspect in the same setting."' The material witness
held in custody faces the functional equivalent of arrest4 7 in
terms of restraint on personal freedom.
However, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation that provides the theoretical underpinning for the pro-
phylactic Miranda rights does not extend to material witnesses.
The Supreme Court applies a two-prong test to determine
whether or not Miranda warnings are necessary; the test re-
quires both custody and interrogation.4" This standard, as inter-
preted by both federal and state courts, does not extend fifth
amendment protections against self-incrimination to the mate-
rial witness. In United States v. Anfield, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that the custody of a material witness
"was not of the type requiring Miranda warnings."" Similarly,
in State v. Dictado,50 the Washington Supreme Court held that
Miranda rights need not be extended to material witnesses, and
that, furthermore, material witnesses do not have any right to
remain silent.51
45. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
46. Suspects questioned by police in a custodial setting have a generally recognized
right to counsel. The Supreme Court derived this right from the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and clarified this
right in later cases. In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977), the Supreme Court
stated that Miranda-type warnings are required "where there has been such a restriction
on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.'" Id. at 495.
47. Just like defendants, the material witness faces pre-trial detention, possible loss
of a job and certain loss of wages, mental anguish, and other disadvantages of
incarceration.
48. California v. Beheler, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 3520 (1983) (per curiam) (determining fac-
tor regarding custody for Miranda purposes is whether there is either arrest or the func-
tional equivalent of arrest); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (determin-
ing factor regarding interrogation for Miranda purposes is whether there is express
questioning or its functional equivalent). See also White, Interrogation Without Ques-
tions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 MICH L. REV. 1209, 1231-32
(1980).
49. 539 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1976)(affirming the conviction of defendant on a per-
jury charge based on statements made by the defendant when he was a material witness
in another trial and stating that defendant's incarceration as a material witness did not
entitle him to Miranda warnings); United States v. Glasco, 488 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1974)
(affirming defendant Glasco's perjury conviction based on testimony given while in cus-
tody as a material witness without benefit of Miranda warnings).
50. 102 Wash. 2d 277, 687 P.2d 172 (1984).
51. Id. at 293, 687 P.2d at 182.
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Finally, although police interrogation of material witnesses
would meet the two-prong Miranda test 52 were the agent in cus-
tody a suspect instead of a material witness, the wording of the
fifth amendment itself excludes material witnesses from its
scope, referring explicitly to criminal cases. 53 Because the mate-
rial witness is not a criminal suspect, the fifth amendment does
not protect the witness.
2. The sixth amendment does not provide a mandatory
right to counsel for the material witness- An expansion of the
sixth amendment right to counsel afforded to criminal defend-
ants during adversarial proceedings would also aid the material
witness."4 Unfortunately, the amendment's express limitation to
criminal cases 55 excludes the material witness from its scope. Al-
though one federal court has claimed that material witnesses
have a constitutionally derived right to counsel, 5 no other court
has so interpreted the scope of the sixth amendment to apply to
material witnesses. This expansive view does not withstand close
constitutional analysis.
In Gideon v. Wainwright 7 the Supreme Court applied the
sixth amendment to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment, requiring appointment of counsel for indigents on trial for
felony offenses. 58 The Court observed that representation by
counsel is essential to assure a fair trial-the objective of the
52. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 9. See also Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (hold-
ing that civil IRS interview in a private home did not constitute custody for Miranda
purposes); United States v. Woods, 720 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that incrimi-
nating statements made by defendants at airport cocktail lounge were admissible as vol-
untary responses to permissible and limited questions prior to any physical detention or
seizure); United States v. Bridwell, 583 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1978)(holding that Miranda
rights did not vest where defendant was questioned in his own office and was not under
arrest and no other indicia of coercion were apparent). The reader should note, however,
that the material witness is subject to far more overt forms of coercion, in that the mate-
rial witness may actually be detained at a police station or in jail with criminal suspects
and may be subject to intense periods of interrogation at the discretion of the arresting
authorities. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. These differences distinguish
the rights of a material witness in his or her civil proceeding from cases that deny the
fifth amendment right to counsel in other types of civil cases.
54. Sixth amendment protections include the right to a public trial, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation, to confront one's accusers, to compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in one's favor, and to be assisted by counsel at critical stages in
one's defense if the crime is certain to lead to a prison sentence. Scott v. Illinois, 440
U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 28 (1971).
55. See supra note 9 for wording of sixth amendment.
56. In re Application of Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Neb. 1977)(holding in habeas
corpus action, without record of appellate review, that fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess requirements necessitate the provision of counsel for material witnesses).
57. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
58. Id. at 344.
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sixth amendment.5 9 Since Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme
Court has further expanded the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel, holding that any crime that results in post-conviction loss of
liberty for the accused, whether a felony or a misdemeanor, gives
rise to a sixth amendment right to counsel 0 at a stage "critical"
to the defendant's defense."1 As the Supreme Court stated in
Mempa v. Rhay, "appointment of counsel for an indigent is re-
quired at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial
rights of a criminal accused may be affected. ' 2 The material
witness meets neither the actual imprisonment standard, nor the
critical stage test.
The actual imprisonment standard established by the Su-
preme Court in Scott v. Illinois" for the application of the sixth
amendment right to trial, excludes the material witness from the
scope of the right. The Court required a showing of actual post-
conviction imprisonment, not merely the threat of imprison-
ment, before the right to be provided with appointed counsel
vests for misdemeanants." The Court also noted that the actual
imprisonment standard provides clear guidance to states, but
that any further expansion of the right to counsel would lead to
confusion."5 Thus, the material witness does not meet this condi-
tion for the application of the sixth amendment right to counsel.
A material witness is threatened with a loss of liberty prior to
the trial rather than subsequent to the trial.6
Even if the material witness fell within the parameters of
Scott v. Illinois, the material witness' right to counsel would
have to vest at a critical stage in a criminal proceeding. 7 Re-
59. Id. at 344.
60. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). The Court, quoting Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970), stressed that "the prospect of imprisonment for how-
ever a short time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or 'petty' matter and
may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his reputation."
See also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (refining the standard for appointment of
counsel, requiring actual post-conviction imprisonment).
61. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
62. Id. at 134. See also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); Coleman v. Ala-
bama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
63. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
64. Id. at 374.
65. Id. at 373.
66. Although the material witness theoretically may challenge a later conviction that
results from his or her detention as a material witness, courts may or may not recognize
that claim. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. Effective protection for the
material witness depends on an explicit statement of rights.
67. See 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.2(b), 20 (1984)(citations
omitted):
Of course, no matter how significant the particular proceeding, the Sixth
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gardless of the interrelatedness of the criminal and civil pro-
ceedings, material witnesses are not, strictly speaking,
"criminals," and are not protected by the sixth amendment. The
material witness would meet the critical stages test if he or she
were a criminal defendant.6 8 Like the fifth amendment, however,
the sixth amendment is expressly limited in application to crimi-
nal prosecutions. 9 The material witness is arrested pursuant to
a criminal investigation, but the procedure itself is civil, and not
criminal, in nature. Although the drafters of the House Judiciary
Report for the 1970 Criminal Justice Act point out the func-
tional similarities between the detention procedures for material
witnesses and criminal suspects, 70 the basic civil/criminal dis-
tinction is impossible to overcome. Absent a criminal prosecu-
tion, the sixth amendment right does not vest.71 Thus, the mate-
rial witness is not protected by the sixth amendment.
3. The need for statutory protection- In order to fully pro-
tect the material witness, both the fifth and sixth amendment
right to counsel would have to be expanded to include the mate-
rial witness. Neither amendment alone would provide adequate
protection for the material witness. The material witness needs
to be represented by counsel both during custodial interrogation
and at the bail hearing. Because the witness may face intense
interrogation prior to the time he or she is brought before a
magistrate7 the witness needs a Miranda-like right to counsel.
Because the bond-setting hearing may be crucial to the material
witness' hope for pre-trial liberty, the witness needs a right to
appointed counsel at the magisterial hearing. The text of both
the fifth and sixth amendments precludes the judicial expansion
of the amendments to provide this right to counsel for the mate-
rial witness.73 Thus, the material witness needs a statutorily de-
fined right to counsel that would apply in either situation.
Although the mechanics of state and federal adoption of a
statutory right to counsel may appear cumbersome and un-
wieldy, the process of statutory amendment is still a compara-
Amendment right does not apply if the proceeding is not part of the "criminal
prosecution." The starting point for the criminal prosecution is the initiation of
"adverse judicial proceedings." It is at that point that the individual becomes an
"accused" person entitled to the application of the Sixth Amendment guarantee.
68. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (holding that a defendant has a
right to contact counsel during the interrogation process).
69. See supra note 9 for wording of the sixth amendment.
70. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 9.
72. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 53, 69 and accompanying text.
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tive advantage over the present system. The material witness is
already under the jurisdiction of statutes that govern the mate-
rial witness' detention and rights while detained. Some statutes
provide a right to counsel, and several even make the right to
counsel mandatory. Amending existing statutes that do not pro-
vide a mandatory right to counsel for the material witness is
therefore a logical step.
II. THE MATERIAL WITNESS SHOULD HAVE A MANDATORY
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The present system discourages the voluntary participation of
the material witness by imposing many of the burdens of a crim-
inal defendant upon the material witness without benefit of
counsel. Statutory protections, both federal and state, prove to
be inadequate to safeguard the material witness from both un-
just and unnecesssary detention. 7' The material witness, there-
fore, needs a statutorily defined right to counsel.
A. Functional Similarities Between the Material Witness
and the Criminal Suspect Justify a Mandatory Right
to Counsel
The legislative history of the 1970 amendments to the Crimi-
nal Justice Act 75 provides justification for a mandatory right to
counsel for the material witness. The House Judiciary Commit-
tee report noted the interrelatedness of the criminal and civil
procedure required for the custody of material witnesses, sug-
gesting that because the two procedures are inherently linked,
the indigent material witness should be allowed the same right
to appointment of counsel as indigent defendants. 71
The hearing at which a magistrate decides whether or not to
require a posting of bond for the release of the material witness
74. See infra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
75. H.R. REP. No. 1546, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3987.
76. Id. at 3988. The House Judiciary Report states that "no right to appointed coun-
sel has as yet been recognized under the sixth amendment. The distinction between civil
and criminal matters, however, has become increasingly obscure where deprivation of
personal liberty is involved." Id. at 3987. The report also notes that material witness
proceedings are "intimately related to the criminal process." Id. at 3988.
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should be viewed as adversarial." The outcome of the hearing
determines whether the material witness will be deprived of his
or her liberty. Therefore, the witness needs counsel to represent
his or her interests just as the criminal defendant needs repre-
sentation at a bail hearing.
B. Police Abuse of Material Witness Statutes Justifies A
Mandatory Right to Counsel
Police sometimes take advantage of outdated and lax material
witness statutes to arrest criminal suspects as material wit-
nesses. 78 Police can place a suspect under arrest as a material
witness and interrogate the suspect without the constraints of
the Miranda rights79 derived from the fifth amendment.80 Police
may then hold the suspect in custody until they gather enough
evidence to establish the probable cause necessary to charge the
material witness for the crime under investigation."
While most use of material witness statutes by prosecutors is
in good faith, there are documented cases in which the authori-
ties have misused the statutes by arresting suspects as material
witnesses," thus evading the constitutional protections afforded
77. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 8, 10 (1970) (holding that the preliminary
hearing is an adversarial stage of the proceedings requiring appointment of counsel when
the purpose of the hearing is to determine whether or not there is sufficient evidence to
warrant presenting the case to a grand jury, and if so, to set bail if the offense is
bailable).
78. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
79. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See supra notes 45-53 and accompany-
ing text.
80. See supra note 9.
81. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Glinton v. Denno, 200 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (convicting defend-
ant based on incriminating statements made during 62 days of custodial interrogation as
material witness without right to counsel during interrogation), aff'd, 309 F.2d 543 (2d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 938 (1963); Wilson v. State, 229 Ga. 395, 191 S.E.2d 783
(1972)(admitting confession of murder suspect obtained through suspect's detention as
material witness and following eight days of intensive interrogation); State v. Giovanni,
375 So. 2d 1360 (La. 1979) (reversing and remanding district court's denial of defend-
ant's motion to suppress oral inculpatory statements because defendant's arrest as a ma-
terial witness was not valid, where no warrant was issued for his arrest as a witness, nor
was there an attempt to procure a warrant, nor was there a prior judicial determination
that defendant's testimony was essential and that there would be ground to fear his
departure from the jurisdiction, and where there was insufficient attenuation between
defendant's illegal arrest and his oral inculpatory statements); State v. McKendall, 584
P.2d 316 (Or. App. 1978) (reversing conviction based on confession derived from illegal
arrest and interrogation of material witness without benefit of counsel); Wilkerson v.
State, 657 S.W. 2d 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (overturning conviction because police
had held defendant as a material witness without a legal basis, and custody as material
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to criminal suspects."3 Some courts condone the police use of
material witness statutes to arrest suspects and accept the con-
fessions of material witnesses obtained under circumstances that
would be unlawful if the witnesses had been detained as sus-
pects.8 4 Other courts treat such actions as an impermissible vio-
lation of the rights of the accused. 5 This lack of uniformity in
the treatment of material witnesses provides further support for
passage of national legislation that would clarify and protect the
rights of the material witness. Material witness statutes should
not be used to detain suspects. Creation of a statutory right to
counsel for the material witness would curtail this abuse.
C. A Mandatory Right to Counsel Would Enhance
Voluntary Cooperation by the Material Witness
Witness participation is essential to the success of the United
States criminal justice system. 6 Because of the poor treatment
witness led to defendant's self-incrimination).
83. In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219 (1979), the Supreme Court stated
that arrest without probable cause violated the fourth amendment and that any confes-
sion subsequent to such an illegal arrest must be suppressed. The Court concluded that
"detention for custodial interrogation-regardless of its label-intrudes so severely on
interests protected by the fourth amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional
safeguards against illegal arrest." Id. at 216. In addition, the fifth and sixth amendment
rights of criminal suspects may be compromised if suspects are instead held as material
witnesses. See infra notes 41-71 and accompanying text for discussion of the fifth and
sixth amendment rights of the accused.
84. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 419 So. 2d 881 (La. 1982) (holding that illegal deten-
tion as material witness and failure to inform the material witness of Miranda rights did
not invalidate later conviction for murder and robbery about which defendant had made
incriminating statements as a material witness); State v. Voltz, 626 S.W.2d 291 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1981) (holding that the conviction of a man who confessed to murder during
interrogation in custody as a material witness was valid in spite of the fact that no prin-
cipal had been arrested when the defendant was taken into custody); State v. Dictado,
102 Wash. 2d 277, 687 P.2d 172 (1984)(concluding that incriminating statements made
by defendant while testifying at trial as a material witness could be used against him in
his later trial and that defendant was entitled neither to sixth amendment right to coun-
sel nor Miranda warnings before testifying at trial as a material witness).
85. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Sandstrom, 382 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1980) (granting material
witness' writ of habeas corpus because no charges were pending before the court against
any person in the first degree murder investigation); People v. Allen, 109 Mich. App. 147,
311 N.W.2d 734 (1981) (reversing conviction of a material witness on the grounds that
his conviction was prejudiced by his treatment as a material witness; he was not repre-
sented by counsel and not given Miranda rights); Young v. State, 670 P.2d 591 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1983) (invalidating defendant's confession because he was detained originally
as a material witness and questioned for 12 hours).
86. See Victim and Witness Assistance, 14 CRIM. JUST. NEWSLETTER, June 6, 1983, at
3 ("The justice system cannot function without the assistance and cooperation of victims
and witnesses."). See also Stein v. People, 346 U.S. 158, 184 (1953)(pointing out that
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of witnesses that may actually lead to less voluntary cooperation
with the police in the long run,8 7 the potential abuse of witness
detention,8s and the possibility of error in the prediction of
whether or not a material witness will flee before trial,8 the
criminal justice system should use detention of material wit-
nesses sparingly. As a means of attaining this end, it is therefore
in the best interests of both the individual material witness and
society in general to provide the material witness with a statu-
tory right to counsel.90
D. Discretionary Standards Fail to Protect the Material
Witness
Although attempts have been made to adapt outmoded mate-
rial witness statutes to comport with modern conceptions of due
process, too little progress has been made in this area in recent
years. On the federal level, the material witness' right to counsel
is left to the discretion of the judge in the underlying criminal
case.
1
"interrogation of those who know something about the facts is the chief means to solu-
tion of crime").
87. Witnessing a Crime Can Land You in Jail, Detroit Free Press, Feb. 12, 1979, at
3C, col. 1 (quoting Ronald Carlson, John Byrd Martin Professor of Law, University of
Georgia School of Law: "[Material witness] laws aren't used often, but they're used just
enough to remind the civic-minded public that this danger is out there and could be used
if they come forward with what they know about a crime."). Empirically, witnesses react
to adverse treatment by the judicial system by becoming less cooperative with the au-
thorities, resulting in the loss of a significant number of criminal convictions. See Nor-
ton, Witness Involvement in the Criminal Justice System and Intention to Cooperate
in Future Prosecutions, 11 J. CRIM. JUST. 143 (1983). See also Shellef & Shichor, supra
note 9, at 199:
Indifference to the very real problems of the witness can-and does-have un-
fortunate consequences for the court system itself leading to a general negative
attitude toward the system and perhaps a decision by the witness to refuse to
participate should a comparable situation arise. These considerations would be
apt to spread to the witness' family and friends-those who learned of his un-
happy experience with the criminal process.
88. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
89. See Application of Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207, 1214 (D. Neb. 1977) (pointing out
that "[tihe crucial issue when the state seeks to secure the presence of a material witness
will usually be whether the witness is likely to appear at the trial in response to a sub-
poena alone. Certainty is impossible, because the witness' intentions as to future acts are
involved. Thus there is a serious risk of error, which can and should be guarded
against.").
90. The intervention of a lawyer to represent the detained person should alleviate
unnecessary disregard for the material witness' interests. Cf. Kamisar, Equal Justice in
the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
OtR Tuz 64 (A.E.D. Howard ed. 1965).
91. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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All district courts have complied with federal law requiring
that they file plans providing requisite procedures for appoint-
ment of counsel.9 2 It is not clear, however, whether counsel is
regularly being provided for material witnesses. The only availa-
ble statistics with regard to appointment of counsel quantify the
number of public defender attorneys appointed under the Crimi-
nal Justice Act to represent detained indigent material wit-
nesses 3 The statistics indicate that the vast majority of ap-
pointments under the- Act occur in only three district courts. 4
Because there are large numbers of material witnesses in other
districts, this is significant evidence that many material wit-
nesses are going without counsel under federal law.
Despite Congress' 1970 amendments to the Criminal Justice
Administration Act, it is unclear whether or not material wit-
nesses are represented. Regardless of the empirical data to date,
representation is discretionary in nature, so that federal law
does not provide the material witness with a guarantee of repre-
sentation. Moreover, even in cases in which the authorities in-
voke material witness statutes in good faith, courts have noted
that society should be wary of depriving a citizen of his or her
liberty under circumstances in which the individual is neither
accused of a crime nor provided with counsel.9 5
92. Telephone interview with Meryl Silverman, Advisory Attorney for the Criminal
Justice Act Division of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (Oct. 10, 1984) [here-
inafter cited as Silverman interview]. These plans are on file with the U.S. Magistrate,
Washington D.C.
93. Criminal Justice Act Attorney Appointments are those appointments of counsel
made on behalf of indigent material witnesses, under the auspices of the 1970 amend-
ments to the Criminal Justice Act of 1964. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) (1982).
94. Silverman interview, supra note 92. According to Advisory Attorney Silverman,
the federal government does not keep complete records in the area of appointment of
counsel in federal courts for material witnesses. A breakdown by district of Criminal
Justice Act panel attorney appointments for material witnesses in custody for fiscal year
1983 indicates that there were a total of 1,817 such appointments in 1983. The majority
of these appointments were made in border areas such as the Southern District of Cali-
fornia (1,105), Arizona (426), the Southern District of Texas (59), and New Mexico (21).
Therefore, the total number of lawyers appointed for indigent material witnesses may be
skewed significantly by what is probably appointment of counsel for illegal aliens in bor-
der states. See supra notes 31, 33 and accompanying text. Although illegal alien material
witnesses are a significant proportion of the total number of material witnesses, it is
unclear why they receive almost all appointed counsel.
95. See Quince v. State, 94 R.I. 200, 205, 179 A.2d 485, 487 (1962)("To the innocent,
even a momentary deprivation of liberty is intolerable; 158 days is an outrage. Confine-
ment of the plaintiff for so long a period among criminals and forcing him to wear prison
garb added the grossest insult to injury."). See also State v. Reid, 114 Ariz. 16, 25, 559
P.2d 136, 145 (1976) (noting that the "[clonfinement of a witness, even for a few days,
not charged with a crime, is a harsh and oppressive measure which we believe is justified
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III. SAFEGUARDING THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
One possible counterargument to the claim that the material
witness should have a mandatory right to counsel is that such
reform might violate the criminal defendant's sixth amendment
right to confrontation. This right encompasses the right to cross-
examine prosecution witnesses.9 6 Hypothetically, if the material
witness' right to counsel precludes the defendant from con-
fronting or cross-examining the witness, this use of such testi-
mony would violate the constitutional rights of the accused. It
could be argued, therefore, that giving the material witness a
mandatory right to counsel would reduce the number of criminal
convictions. If properly drafted, however, liberalization of mate-
rial witness statutes will not threaten the defendant's constitu-
tional rights.9 7
Further, it should be noted that our criminal justice system
does not eliminate or reduce criminal defendants' rights on the
grounds that it would be easier to gain convictions if basic con-
stitutional rights were not observed. In the same vein, even if
appointment of counsel makes criminal convictions more diffi-
cult in some cases, that does not justify the abuse of any individ-
ual material witness' rights. Finally, it is clear that protecting
the rights of the material witness will make it more likely, not
less likely, that the witness will cooperate.9 "
While release of a material witness and possible reliance upon
the deposed testimony at trial could preclude the defendant
from confrontation of his or her accuser, safeguards, such as
videotaping of the material witness' deposition and the cross-ex-
amination of the material witness by defense counsel, can be
taken to protect the defendant's constitutional rights.9 These
only in the most extreme circumstances"), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 921 (1977).
96. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
97. See Application of Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207, 1214 (D. Neb. 1977) (concluding
that the material witness should be given the right to counsel in spite of the state's
interest in securing testimony for criminal trials, because "that interest need not be
threatened by procedural protections afforded to the material witness whose liberty is
threatened. Whatever safeguards are necessary can be incorporated into the extensive
criminal procedures necessarily attendant to the criminal prosecution. Moreover, emer-
gency procedures can be devised to serve the legitimate state interest where flight of the
witness is imminent.")
98. See supra note 87 and accompanying text for the impact of poor treatment of
witnesses on the likelihood of their future cooperation.
99. Both the videotaping of the material witness' deposition and the cross-examina-
tion of the material witness by defense counsel at the deposition act as important safe-
guards of the defendant's sixth amendment confrontation right. See, e.g., M. BELLi,
MODERN TRIALs §59.1 (2d ed. 1982)(videotape can convey demeanor evidence, witness'
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safeguards could be added to any model statute mandating ap-
pointment of counsel for the material witness.
IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO MATERIAL WITNESS STATUTES
AND RECENT LEGISLATION
The material witness needs legislation devoted to the purpose
of guaranteeing right to counsel for the witness. This section
provides one example of such a statute, and also analyzes past
and current legislative attempts on the federal level to provide a
right to counsel for the material witness.
A. Proposed Amendment
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND POLICY
Finding that public policy requires a response to the
denial of counsel to material witnesses;
that the judicial system cannot function without the
cooperation of witnesses, of which material witnesses
are a vital component;
that material witnesses are innocent people who
have witnessed, not committed, a crime;
that the present system discourages the participa-
appearance, and other non-verbal messages); Boudreaux, Is it Time for Texas to Amend
Rule 215c to Adopt Guidelines for Taking Videotape Depositions?, 24 S. TEx. L.J. 225,
227-28 (1983); see also Rypinski, Videotaping Depositions, 17 HAWAII BAR J. 67 (1982)
(noting that a videotaped deposition provides fuller demeanor evidence than a transcript
of a deposition). Videotaped depositions can be arranged so that defense counsel has
adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness, thus protecting defendant's right to
confrontation.
In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the Court admitted testimony from a prelimi-
nary hearing for an unavailable prosecution witness. The Court suggested that "the op-
portunity to cross-examine at the preliminary hearing-even absent actual cross-exami-
nation-satisfies the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 70. The Court admitted the witness'
prior testimony because the absent witness had been questioned thoroughly at the pre-
liminary hearing. Id. at 71.
In at least one jurisdiction that has recently begun the routine videotaping of material
witness depositions, the average length of incarceration has dropped from six to eight
months to less than 30 days. Telephone interview with Robert Shivers, immigration at-
torney practicing in the Western District of Texas (Sept. 14, 1985). Until January of
1984, the Western District of Texas held its illegal alien material witnesses six to eight
months-until the relevant cases were disposed of. In the past year, that district has
established videotaping procedures for material witness depositions, and the videotaping
of depositions has reduced the time of incarceration to a maximum of 30 days.
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tion of material witnesses in the judicial system;
that in the present system, neither constitutional
guarantees nor statutory provisions adequately pro-
tect material witnesses from abusive police interroga-
tion and/or lengthy confinement;
and, that material witnesses and society in general
will benefit from more equitable treatment of material
witnesses,
This legislation amends and supplements other ma-
terial witness statutes by providing for a statutory
right to counsel for all material witnesses.
SECTION 1: DEFINITIONS
In this Act:
(a) "material witness" means a witness to a
criminal act whom the police have desig-
nated as unlikely to voluntarily provide
needed testimony at trial, and who is there-
fore arrested by police to compel appear-
ance at trial.
(b) "custodial interrogation" means question-
ing during custody.
(c) "indigent" means financially unable to ob-
tain counsel, as determined by a magistrate
or by the court through appropriate
inquiry.
SECTION 2: RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A material witness must be provided with counsel.
Prior to custodial interrogation, arresting authorities
must inform the material witness of a right to have
counsel present during custodial interrogation. Police
must inform an indigent material witness of a right to
have counsel appointed by the court. United States
Magistrates and District Judges may appoint counsel
for material witnesses.
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Comment
This provision establishes the statutory and mandatory right
of material witnesses to be represented by counsel during custo-
dial interrogation. It also provides for the appointment of coun-
sel for indigent material witnesses in a manner similar to the
provision of counsel for indigent defendants.
SECTION 3: COURT APPEARANCES
Unless the material witness has knowingly, intelli-
gently and voluntarily waived the right to counsel, the
material witness must be accompanied by counsel at
any hearings affecting conditions of release.
Comment
Like a defendant held before trial, the material witness needs
representation in court, at the bail hearing or any other hearing,
to adequately protect his or her rights. Because the material wit-
ness is incarcerated without suspicion of guilt for any crime, but
is not afforded the same constitutional protections as a criminal
suspect, the need for representation by counsel is particularly
acute.
SECTION 4: RELEASE OF MATERIAL WITNESSES
No material witness shall be detained because of an
inability to post a bail bond if the testimony of the wit-
ness can be adequately secured by deposition under
this section.
Comment
This section is provided to guarantee prompt release of the
material witness. This section could operate in conjunction with
a system for videotaping material witness testimony in order to
protect the constitutional rights of the criminal defendant. A
separate program should be established to deal with the unique
[VOL. 19:2
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problems faced by illegal alien material witnesses in border
states.
SECTION 5: ENFORCEMENT
Any violation of section 2 or section 3 of this legisla-
tion shall result in the suppression of that witness' tes-
timony at the relevant criminal trial.
Comment
This provision provides an enforcement mechanism for the stat-
ute. The threat of suppression of testimony is introduced to en-
courage compliance with the rest of the statute.
B. 1984-85 Reform Attempts
Legislation introduced during the 1984 congressional session,
as part of the Criminal Justice Act Revisions of 1984, would
have eliminated the discretionary nature of the appointment of
counsel and mandated representation of all indigent material
witnesses.'00 Time constraints forced Congress to condense the
legislation, passing some amendments to the Criminal Justice
Administration Act but omitting the material witness provi-
sion.10' This portion of the legislation has since been reintro-
100. H.R. 4307, S. 2420, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (identical bills in the House and
Senate). See also Committee notes to JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE TO IMPLEMENT
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT REVISION OF 1981 2. Three years ago
the Judicial Conference originally drafted the provision guaranteeing counsel for indi-
gent material witnesses, stating:
Subparagraph a(1)(A)(vii) makes appointment of counsel for a material witness
who is in custody mandatory, and not discretionary as currently provided in sub-
section (g). This . . . reflects the view that any person held in custody against
his or her will, whether as a defendant or one designated by a party as a material
witness, should have an attorney to assist him or her in exercising all rights pro-
vided by law.
101. Cf. Effron, Congress Tackled Major Legal Issues, But Result Mixed; Bank-
ruptcy, Criminal Codes Are Amended; Immigration Bill Fails, Reagan Agenda Stalls,
97 L.A. DAILY J. 1 (Oct. 16, 1984) (noting that Criminal Justice Act attorney fees were
increased); Silverman interview, supra note 92. Silverman confirmed that while there
was little controversy surrounding the measure, the time constraints at the close of the
session precluded its passage in the 1984 congressional session.
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duced as separate legislation in the 1985-86 legislative session.102
The House of Representatives has passed the bill.1 0 3 Thus, it
may pass into law in 1986.104
Even if this bill becomes law, however, its limited scope pre-
cludes increased effectiveness in dealing with the problems of
material witnesses. The current legislation, like last year's pro-
posed amendment to the Criminal Justice Act, constitutes a
brief addendum to a statute providing counsel for indigent crim-
inal defendants.' 0 5 Neither bill would focus any attention on the
unique constitutional posture of detained material witnesses.
There are two specific problems that neither bill recognized.
First, the proposed statutes both fail to state explicitly that a
detained material witness who is not indigent has a right to
counsel.106 This is important because the material witness needs
a statute that provides explicit recognition of the right to coun-
sel as a general rule. Second, the bills fail to provide guidelines
with regard to the permissibility of custodial interrogation
before the court appoints counsel for the indigent material wit-
ness. 107 Neither bill provides a clear statement of the material
witness' rights. The legislative proposals thus fail to provide an
adequate model for the states to follow.
CONCLUSION
In the present system, the material witness lacks basic protec-
tions granted to all criminal defendants. Because neither the
United States Constitution nor the various state and federal
statutes that authorize detention of the material witness pro-
vides adequate protection against unfair detention and police
102. H.R. 3004 § 2(a)(1)(g), S. 1581 § 2(a)(1)(g), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (identi-
cal bills in the House and Senate).
103. H.R. 3004 was passed by the House the week of December 13, 1985. The Week
in Congress, CCH Editorial Staff Publication, Dec. 13, 1985, at 4.
104. The Senate bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee on August 1, 1985.
There has been no further action. 1 CONG. INDEX (CCH), 99th Congress, Senate, 1985-86.
105. See H.R. REP. No. 764, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984)(documenting the need to
upgrade Criminal Justice Act (CJA) attorney fees, and noting that this is "[tihe primary
impetus for the revision of the CJA").
106. See id. Neither bill would deal with the general issue of guaranteeing counsel for
material witnesses. See supra notes 41-71 and accompanying text for discussion of the
constitutional status of provision of counsel for the material witness.
107. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
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abuse, a uniform statute should be adopted to mandate provi-
sion of counsel for the material witness.
-Susan Kling

